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Consumer Credit and Payments*
*The views expressed here are those of the 
author and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve System.
n September 24-25, 2009, the Research 
Department and the Payment Cards Center 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
held their fifth joint conference to present 
and discuss the latest research on consumer credit and 
payments. Sixty participants attended the conference, 
which included seven research papers on topics such as 
securitization and distressed loan renegotiation, consumer 
disclosure, data breaches and identity theft, and the 
effects of the U.S. financial crisis on global retail lending. 
In this article, Mitchell Berlin summarizes the papers 
presented at the conference.
In his opening remarks, Mitchell 
Berlin noted that the flow of high-
quality papers on consumer finance 
and payment issues has increased 
steadily since the first joint conference 
of the Research Department and Pay-
ment Cards Center in 2001.
SECURITIZATION AND
RENEGOTIATION
In the first paper, Tomasz Piskor-
ski of Columbia University reported 
the results of a study (with Amit 
Seru and Vikrant Vig) that provided 
evidence that frictions impeded the 
renegotiation of certain types of 
distressed mortgages during the recent 
financial crisis.1 In particular, Piskorski 
and his coauthors showed that loans 
that banks packaged into mortgage-
backed securities and placed in trusts 
— securitized loans — were foreclosed 
on more often than otherwise simi-
lar mortgages that remained in bank 
portfolios.  
The authors examined a large 
sample (about 327,000) of first-lien, 
nonagency mortgages originated 
between 2005 and 2006.  This sample 
is drawn from the LPS database, 
which includes both loans held in the 
originating bank’s portfolio and loans 
that were securitized.  The sample was 
restricted to distressed mortgages, that 
is, loans that were at least 60 days’ 
delinquent.  They also considered a 
subsample of high-quality loans: loans 
with full documentation (full doc) with 
credit scores above 680.
First, the authors presented 
descriptive statistics showing that dis-
tressed portfolio loans were foreclosed 
less often than securitized loans. Then 
they used a logit model to estimate the 
probability of foreclosure, depending 
on whether the loan was securitized or 
held in portfolio, but also taking ac-
count of loan and borrower character-
istics that might affect this probability. 
These included the borrower’s credit 
score, the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, 
the size of the loan at origination, the 
loan maturity, and the original interest 
rate, among other variables.
The logit results provided evi-
dence that delinquent portfolio loans 
were less likely to be foreclosed and 
that the effect was both statistically 
significant and economically large. 
Evaluated at the mean values for all of 
the other variables, the probability of 
being foreclosed was between 3.8 and 
7 percentage points lower for portfolio 
loans than for securitized loans, de-
pending on the precise model specifi-
cation. These corresponded to an 18 
percent and 32 percent relative decline 
in the mean foreclosure rate.  
Piskorski and his coauthors 
1 The conference agenda along with links 
to most of the papers presented can be 
found on the Philadelphia Fed’s web-
site at: http://www.philadelphiafed.org/
research-and-data/events/2009/consumer-
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sought to address concerns 
that lenders may have learned 
information about borrower quality 
subsequent to origination but prior 
to delinquency. If this were true, the 
sample of securitized loans might 
disproportionately include loans that 
the originating bank had sold after 
receiving information, suggesting a 
higher probability of default.  First, 
they replicated their basic results using 
a subsample of high-quality loans, 
arguably a set of loans for which it is 
less likely that underwriters might have 
subsequently learned more information 
about borrower quality. They also 
addressed this concern more directly 
by examining a subsample of loans 
for which borrowers’ credit scores or 
LTVs at the time of delinquency were 
available. In these tests, the authors 
continued to find that portfolio loans 
were less likely to be foreclosed than 
securitized loans.
The authors also addressed 
concerns that their results were driven 
by differences in variations in state 
laws that affect the ease of foreclosure. 
Specifically, they divided states into 
tough and weak states, depending 
on whether average foreclosure times 
were low or high.  They found that 
securitized loans were significantly 
more likely to be foreclosed in both 
tough and weak states, a finding 
inconsistent with the view that 
differences in state laws were the 
source of their results.
The authors also considered 
the possibility that the differences 
in foreclosure rates were not driven 
by a bias against renegotiation for 
securitized loans but by a bias against 
foreclosures by banks postponing 
recognizing losses on portfolio loans. 
Piskorski and coauthors found that 
delinquent borrowers resumed making 
payments on loans held in portfolio at 
a higher rate than for securitized loans, 
a finding inconsistent with this view.   
LIAR’S LOANS
Ashlyn Aiko Nelson of Indiana 
University discussed the results of a 
study (with Wei Jiang and Edward 
Vytlacil) that explored the effects 
on loan performance of origination 
channel and level of documentation 
for mortgage loans. Nelson and her 
coauthors found that loans originated 
by brokers and loans that required 
little or no documentation by the bor-
rower (low doc loans) were particularly 
prone to agency problems. Nelson 
argued that broker-originated loans 
performed badly because brokers had 
incentives to make loans to low-quality 
borrowers, while low doc loans were 
more likely to perform badly because 
borrowers overstated income.
Nelson and her coauthors exam-
ined the mortgage loans made between 
January 2004 and February 2009 by 
a large national mortgage bank.  The 
bank’s files contained a wealth of 
data about borrower characteristics, 
permitting the authors to take account 
of many borrower-specific factors that 
might affect loan performance. The 
authors divided their sample into four 
subsamples: loans originated by brokers 
requiring full documentation, loans 
originated by brokers requiring low or 
no documentation, loans originated by 
banks requiring full documentation, 
and loans originated by brokers requir-
ing low or no documentation.
Nelson explained that the loan 
sample was not representative of the 
mortgage loan market as a whole, 
which raised some questions about 
the extent to which the results could 
be generalized. The bank made a 
disproportionately large share of loans 
originated by brokers and a dispropor-
tionately large share of low doc loans. 
Nonetheless, the authors’ view was 
that this bank represented an extreme 
example of tendencies that were com-
mon to many banks.
In their main econometric treat-
ment, the authors used two models of 
loan delinquency: (1) a probit model, 
which estimates the probability of 
delinquency, taking into account loan 
and borrower characteristics; (2) a 
duration model, which estimates the   
average time to delinquency, taking 
into account the same characteristics. 
They estimated separate regressions for 
each of the four subsamples and found 
that both the origination channel and 
the level of documentation affected 
delinquency. Specifically, they found 
that bank-originated full doc loans had 
a delinquency rate of 13 percent and 
a five-year survival rate of 86 percent, 
while the comparable numbers for 
bank-originated low doc loans were 18 
percent and 68 percent; broker-orig-
inated full doc loans were 24 percent 
and 65 percent; and broker-originated 
low doc loans were 32 percent and 36 
percent.
Nelson explained that particular 
types of borrowers might have selected 
into particular types of loans. To ad-
dress this issue, the authors estimated 
a model to explain which types of bor-
rowers chose particular types of loans. 
Broadly, they found that borrowers 
using brokers had lower credit quality 
and less experience with mortgages. In 
contrast, in addition to self-employed 
borrowers, low doc borrowers were 
Piskorski and 
coauthors found that 
delinquent borrowers 
resumed making 
payments on loans 
held in portfolio at a 
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typically more experienced and of 
higher credit quality.
The authors then sought to 
examine the separate effects of observ-
able and unobservable differences in 
borrower risk on delinquency. Accord-
ing to the authors, many of the low doc 
loans looked good on paper but did 
poorly, suggesting that the poor per-
formance of low doc loans was due to 
factors that did not appear on the loan 
applications. In contrast, more than 
half of the poor performance of broker 
loans was due to observable borrower 
characteristics. 
To explain the poor performance 
of low doc loans, Nelson and coauthors 
explored the evidence for falsified loan 
application information. In one of 
their approaches to this question, they 
hypothesized that falsified application 
information would reduce the predic-
tive power of the empirical model. 
To create an out-of-sample test, they 
estimated the model over six-month 
periods to predict the probability of 
delinquency for the subsequent six-
month period. The model’s predictive 
power was substantially lower for the 
low doc subsamples, a result consistent 
with falsified application information.  
The authors also performed a 
more direct test for falsified applica-
tion information in low doc loans. 
They identified the particular borrower 
attributes most likely to be falsified: 
whether the home was a primary resi-
dence, employment information, and 
information about income, wealth, and 
existing debt.  The results for income 
provided the most striking evidence of 
overstatement.
In the full doc samples, income 
was negatively related to delinquency. 
However, in the low doc samples, stat-
ed income was positively related to de-
linquency, and the effect was strongest 
when the loan had been originated by 
brokers without an ongoing relation-
ship with the bank. The authors also 
attempted to quantify the extent of the 
overstatement, comparing stated in-
come with alternative measures of the 
borrower’s true income, for example, 
average income in the borrower’s ZIP 
code.  They found that the ratio of 
stated income to average income in the 
ZIP code was significantly higher for 
the low doc sample and estimated that 
income was overstated by between 15 
and 20 percent.  
DISCLOSURE AND PAYDAY 
LENDING
Adair Morse of the University 
of Chicago reported the results of a 
carefully designed field study (with 
Marianne Bertrand) that attempted to 
determine whether payday borrowers’ 
decisions were affected by particular 
types of cognitive bias and whether 
their borrowing decisions might be af-
fected by particular types of disclosures 
at the point of the transaction.
In a payday loan, borrowers sign 
over their next paycheck and pay a fee 
($15-17 for each $100 borrowed) in 
exchange for a loan. Payday loans are 
quite expensive compared with other 
types of loans, with annual percentage 
rates (APRs) typically exceeding 400 
percent, and customers typically bor-
rowing repeatedly.  According to the 
authors, one explanation for why bor-
rowers use such an expensive source of 
borrowed funds is cognitive bias. For 
example, borrowers may not realize 
how high the APR on the payday loan 
is, if they don’t compare it to relevant 
alternatives. Alternatively, they may 
focus on the cost of borrowing once, 
even though they are likely to borrow 
repeatedly.
The authors considered three dif-
ferent disclosures. In one, the APR on 
a payday loan was compared with the 
APRs on other types of loans likely to 
be familiar to payday borrowers. The 
second disclosure displayed the dollar 
cost of repeated borrowings up to 
three months and compared this with 
the dollar cost of repeated borrowings 
on a credit card.  The third disclo-
sure illustrated the likelihood that a 
typical payday borrower will engage in 
repeated borrowings, e.g., how many 
borrow once, how many renew once or 
twice, etc.
The goal of the experiment was 
to determine whether a disclosure 
reduced either the likelihood or the 
amount of subsequent borrowings. 
Furthermore, Morse and her coauthor 
examined whether the disclosures 
worked for particular types of borrow-
ers, for example, whether a borrower’s 
level of education or some measure of 
the borrower’s degree of self-control 
might affect the outcome of a particu-
lar disclosure.
The authors performed this exper-
iment with the cooperation of a large 
payday lender operating in 10 states.  
They had access to all customers enter-
ing 77 stores over a two-week period. 
Crucially, the experiment was designed 
so that the disclosures (including no 
disclosure at all) were randomly as-
signed over borrowers. The goal was 
to minimize the possibility that factors 
other than the actual disclosures might 
affect borrower behavior; for example, 
the disclosures were equally distributed 
across different days of the week be-
cause a Monday borrower might differ 
from a Thursday borrower.   Morse re-
[Borrowers] may focus on the cost 
of borrowing once, even though they 
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ported that subsequent empirical tests 
by her and her coauthor verified that 
the experimental design had success-
fully randomized across customers. 
The lender’s records also included 
demographic data about each bor-
rower, for example, level of education; 
financial data; and information about 
past and subsequent transactions with 
the customer, provided by the lender. 
In addition to these data, participat-
ing borrowers also answered survey 
questions about the intended use of 
the loan and the borrower’s own view 
of his or her planning and spending 
habits. Using the survey answers, the 
authors designed an index of borrower 
self-control and a gratification index 
measuring whether the loan was for 
discretionary expenditures. 
The authors’ main result was 
that there was a statistically signifi-
cant and economically large effect on 
subsequent borrowing behavior for the 
disclosure that added up the costs of 
subsequent borrowings in dollars. The 
effect was to reduce both the likeli-
hood of further borrowing and the sub-
sequent amounts borrowed. In particu-
lar, borrowers receiving this disclosure 
were 5.5 percentage points less likely 
to borrow in subsequent pay cycles (10 
percent less likely to borrow compared 
with the control group) and they bor-
rowed nearly $40 less (17 percent less 
than the control group). Morse noted 
that this effect was large for this type 
of experimental study, especially since 
the disclosure was made only once.
The effects of the other disclo-
sures on the likelihood of subsequent 
borrowings were relatively weaker, 
both statistically and economically. 
In particular, disclosing relative APRs 
seemed to have little effect. In both 
cases, however, there was evidence of 
some reduction in the amounts bor-
rowed.
The authors also found that the 
effects differed across different types 
of customers. The decline in the 
probability of borrowing occurred 
mainly among individuals without a 
college degree. The decline was also 
stronger for those borrowers who 
reported higher self-control, those who 
were not borrowing for discretionary 
purposes, and those with lower debt-
to-income ratios. This last result is 
broadly consistent with the authors’ 
other finding that reduced borrowing 
occurred only with a lag. According 
to Morse, borrowers may have needed 
time to adjust their financial situation, 
while others in more financially 
strained circumstances may simply 
have been unable to adjust, at least in 
the time frame considered in the study.
In conclusion, Morse and 
coauthor suggested that the success 
of the disclosure in the payday setting 
justifies further explorations of policies 
that might reduce consumer biases in 
other contexts.  
IDENTITY THEFT
William Roberds of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta presented 
the results of a theoretical model (with 
Stacey Schreft) that examined the 
incentives for competing networks 
— for example, credit card networks 
— to adopt policies to reduce identity 
theft. The underlying questions 
were whether networks collect too 
much information and whether they 
adopt appropriate levels of security to 
protect that data. In general, Roberds 
argued that competing networks 
have incentives to collect too much 
personally identifiable information 
(PII)— for example, name, address, 
Social Security number, and so forth— 
while spending too few resources to 
protect it from theft. 
In their model, many individuals 
are honest and joined one of two 
competing networks to facilitate 
making transactions to purchase 
goods. But some individuals are 
fraudulent types; that is, they seek to 
join a network and then default on 
their payments. 
The authors identified two types 
of identify theft, both involving open-
ing new accounts, rather than steal-
ing an existing customer’s account, 
to purchase goods at the customer’s 
network. First, skilled identity thieves 
can use sophisticated techniques — for 
example, hacking the network’s data-
base — to steal PII from one network 
to join another network (high-tech 
fraud).  A second type of identity 
theft (low-tech fraud) simply requires 
someone to assemble enough informa-
tion to create a viable identity to join 
a network, for example, by stealing a 
wallet and impersonating that person. 
This type of theft requires no skill, but 
it does require time and effort, and it is 
more costly for an impersonator to join 
a network if he or she must provide 
more information.
Networks have two potential 
security strategies. The first is to col-
lect more PII about a customer. By 
keeping this information on record, 
the network can increase the likeli-
hood that fraudulent customers will be 
detected if they attempt to imperson-
ate a new customer applying for credit. 
The second security strategy is for the 
network to spend resources to protect 
its database. In particular, it can make 
it more difficult for skilled frauds to 
steal PII.
Roberds explained that data 
security involves an externality: By de-
manding a lot of PII to join, a network 
makes it more difficult for fraudulent 
customers to join. But keeping very de-
tailed information about the network’s 
own customers in its database makes 
it easier for skilled identity thieves 
to use stolen data to join the other 
network, because this tends to increase 
the likely overlap in the types of PII 
required to join each network. And 
a network’s costly measures to secure Business Review  Q1  2010   35 www.philadelphiafed.org
its own database from skilled identity 
thieves reduce fraud at the competing 
network.
To provide a benchmark for 
evaluating the choices of competing 
networks, the authors performed a 
thought experiment. They asked: How 
much information and data security 
would a benevolent social planner 
instruct the networks to choose?  This 
planner would take into account all 
of the costs and benefits to individu-
als, and these hypothetical choices are 
termed the optimal outcome.2 After 
calculating the optimal outcome, the 
authors examined market outcomes 
in successively more general examples 
and compared these with the optimal 
outcomes.  
In the first example, they assume 
that firms do not secure their data at 
all. In this case, firms collect too much 
information. Collecting more informa-
tion makes it harder for a thief to con-
struct a viable identity to join but also 
makes it easier for a thief to steal data 
that can be used at the other network.  
In this example, networks collect too 
much information and data breaches 
occur more often than in the optimum, 
but interestingly, the prevalence of 
identity theft is lower than the optimal 
level. The more overlap between the 
PII collected by the competing net-
works, the greater the inefficiency.
In their second example, they 
assume that the proportions of skilled 
and unskilled frauds are identical. 
Again the basic externality arises: Net-
works collect too much information 
and invest too little in data security. 
The main insight from this example 
is that although identity theft is lower 
than in the optimum, it is unskilled 
theft that is mainly deterred. Networks 
make it very difficult for unskilled 
thieves to join, but their excessive data 
collection and inadequate data security 
makes skilled identity theft relatively 
attractive.
For the most part, these insights 
carry over to the most general version 
of the model, in which security levels 
are freely chosen by the networks. In 
this setting, the authors showed that 
when networks require substantially 
similar types of information, security 
levels were too low and networks col-
lected too much data.  The authors 
argued that, in effect, competing 
networks substitute information col-
lection for data security. As in the 
simpler examples, there was too much 
skilled identity theft and too little 
unskilled identity theft compared with 
optimal levels. Furthermore, there is 
less identity theft in equilibrium than 
in the optimum, even though networks 
collect too much information.
Finally, the authors examined the 
effects of public policies that might 
improve market outcomes. Since the 
model is quite complicated, they used 
simulations to evaluate the effects of 
these policies. One possibility is to 
increase civil liability for data breaches.   
They found that this improved incen-
tives to increase security, but networks 
still collected too much information. A 
second approach is for some govern-
ment agency to set minimum data se-
curity standards. This nearly attained 
the optimal outcome in their simula-
tions. A third approach is to limit data 
collection. This policy did as well as 
imposing civil liability but significantly 
increased identity theft.
BANKRUPTCY REFORM AND 
MORTGAGE DEFAULT
Michelle White of the University 
of California-San Diego reported on 
the results of an empirical study (with 
Wenli Li and Ning Zhu) of the effects 
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005 
on mortgage default. Broadly, they 
argued that the passage of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act was associated with 
a statistically significant and eco-
nomically large increase in mortgage 
defaults. According to the authors, the 
act may have contributed to the sever-
ity of the subsequent crisis in housing 
markets.
White argued that bankruptcy 
law helped people save their homes, 
at least temporarily, but also reduced 
the costs of ultimately defaulting on 
the mortgage. Under both Chapter 7 
(liquidation) and Chapter 13 (restruc-
turing) proceedings, homeowners can 
protect exempted assets, in particular, 
homes in which a household’s equity 
does not exceed the state-mandated 
homestead exemption. Both bankrupt-
cy procedures also give a delinquent 
homeowner some time to pay back 
missed mortgage payments (arrears), 
but Chapter 13 provides a substantially 
longer period (three to five years) and 
also permits delinquent homeowners 
who cannot pay back arrears a signifi-
cant amount of time before foreclosure.
The Bankruptcy Act of 2005 
had three main effects that might 
affect delinquent homeowners:  First, 
2 It is important to note that while there 
are real costs to identity theft, the optimal 
level of identity theft is not zero.  This is 
because it is costly to deter theft, and these 
costs are ultimately borne by individuals.
Broadly, [White, Li, and Zhu] argued that the 
passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act was 
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it raised filing costs, thus making it 
less attractive for a household to use 
bankruptcy to save a home either 
permanently or temporarily. The act 
also placed a cap on the homestead 
exemption at $125,000, a provision 
that affected 10 states with high 
homestead exemptions. Third, the act 
imposed a means test for homeowners 
to use Chapter 7. Specifically, it 
required consumers with incomes 
above the state median to file using 
Chapter 13.
The authors’ empirical strategy 
was to use a difference-in-difference 
approach. In particular, the authors 
examined the differential effects of the 
change in bankruptcy law on certain 
households living in different states. 
The empirical tests exploited variation 
in consumers’ circumstances, state 
median incomes, and state homestead 
exemptions to determine whether the 
act affected homeowner delinquency.
The authors used data from 
LPS on the performance of first-lien 
30-year mortgages. These data also 
included information about customer 
credit quality, notably credit scores at 
the time the loan was originated. By 
merging the LPS data with data from 
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 
the authors could also take account 
of information and homeowner 
demographic characteristics, most 
notably household income.  The final 
sample included about 381,000 prime 
mortgages and 268,000 subprime 
mortgages.
Using these data, the authors 
examined whether mortgage defaults 
increased following passage of the act 
for those homeowners for whom the 
provisions of the act were actually 
binding, in other words, in cases in 
which consumers had equity in excess 
of the now lower exemptions or where 
the consumer was now required to 
use his or her excess cash flow to pay 
nonmortgage debts. Specifically, they 
examined a window of three months 
before and after passage of the act.
Descriptive statistics showed that 
following passage of the act, default 
rates were 15 percent higher for prime 
loans and 9 percent higher for sub-
prime loans. In addition, default rates 
increased even more for homeown-
ers who were subject to the new cap 
on the homestead exemption and for 
prime homeowners who failed the 
means test.  However, defaults de-
creased for homeowners with subprime 
loans who failed the means test.  The 
authors interpreted these findings as 
largely consistent with the view that 
the act increased mortgage defaults.
The authors then estimated a 
logit hazard model, which estimates 
the probability of defaulting with the 
passage of time, taking into account 
the changes in the bankruptcy law that 
might affect a particular household, 
and controlling for a large number of 
demographic variables. They found 
that homeowners subject to the cap on 
the homestead exemption were more 
likely to default following passage of 
the act; specifically, White and her 
coauthors found that prime mortgage 
holders subject to the cap were 53 
percent more likely to default and 
subprime mortgage holders were 44 
percent more likely to default.  Prime 
mortgage borrowers subject to the 
means test were 14 percent more likely 
to default, but there was no effect for 
subprime mortgage borrowers. White 
suggested that the result for subprime 
mortgage borrowers may have been 
due to income having been overstated 
by these borrowers.
Results were largely the same 
when the authors reestimated their 
model using a six-month window be-
fore and after passage of the act.  Thus, 
the authors concluded that the effects 
of act were not temporary.
CONSUMER PROTECTION 
LAWS
Simon Gervais of Duke University 
presented the results of a theoretical 
model (with Bruce Carlin) that exam-
ined the role of the legal system when 
customers are poorly informed about 
the appropriate type of financial prod-
uct to buy. In their model, households 
depend on brokers to match them to 
financial products for which they are 
best suited.
The main assumption of the 
model is that particular products 
are better suited for particular 
types of consumers. For example, 
a household with moderate savings 
and a student in high school might 
be better advised to invest its savings 
for college in a fixed income product, 
rather than a stock index fund, but 
the household might not have the 
sophistication to know which product 
is most appropriate. In Gervais and 
Carlin’s model, both brokers and the 
producers of financial products must 
exert costly effort:  At some cost, 
brokers can direct consumers to those 
products that suit them best, although 
there is an unavoidable probability 
of a mistake. Similarly, at some cost, 
The Bankruptcy Act of 2005 had three 
main effects that might affect delinquent 
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the producers of financial products 
can develop higher quality products 
that are suited to a wider range of 
consumers. Crucially, no court can 
observe their effort directly, nor can 
the court disentangle the reason why 
a particular product turned out poorly 
for a particular customer: Was it a bad 
match or a bad product?
In this setup, Gervais explained 
that product quality and effort by 
brokers are partial substitutes; that is, 
more effort by a broker reduces losses 
to consumers and this, in turn, reduces 
the producer’s incentive to develop the 
highest quality product. In a similar 
fashion, when higher quality financial 
products are developed, there is less 
chance of losses to consumers, and this 
reduces brokers’ incentives to identify 
the most suitable products for their 
customers. 
The law’s design must take this 
interaction into account. For example, 
while legal penalties for a broker will 
tend to increase broker effort, thereby 
increasing the probability of a good 
match for the customer, this will tend 
to decrease the provision of quality 
products because the firm realizes that 
the broker’s effort will make up for the 
lack of quality.
First, the authors demonstrated 
that without legal penalties, the mar-
ket leads to a serious underprovision 
of effort both by brokers and firms. 
Indeed, in their stylized setup, consum-
ers are not willing to buy the product 
at all and the market breaks down al-
together. Intuitively, without penalties, 
consumers who pay a price up-front 
expecting an appropriate financial 
product will always be disappointed 
because producers and brokers always 
have an incentive to chisel once they 
have been paid.
Gervais then presented their 
main results in a version of the model 
in which a customer can seek redress 
through the legal system only when he 
or she has followed a broker’s advice.  
In this context, the authors showed 
that to achieve an efficient outcome, 
total legal penalties can’t merely be 
compensatory; they must be punitive. 
This conclusion is jointly the result of 
the substitutability of effort by pro-
ducers and brokers and of the court’s 
inability to assign blame to one or the 
other for a bad outcome.  When the 
law seeks to push, say, the broker to 
increase effort by penalizing him or 
her when a match turns out poorly, 
the producer of the financial product 
responds by reducing effort.  Intui-
tively, this means that total penalties 
must exceed the losses imposed on the 
borrower for having been mismatched 
to induce full effort by both brokers 
and producers.
The authors then enriched the 
basic model to include the realistic 
possibility that the firm pays the broker 
for each sale. In this setting, they show 
that the optimal penalty structure 
places higher penalties on the broker 
than when brokers do not receive 
direct payments from producers.  
Gervais then explained how legal 
penalties changed if customers were 
permitted to seek legal redress even 
when they have ignored a broker’s 
advice. In this setting, Gervais and 
Carlin demonstrated that the optimal 
penalties were no longer punitive; cus-
tomers only received compensation for 
having made a poor decision. Intuitive-
ly, punitive penalties reward custom-
ers for ignoring their broker’s advice 
and then seeking redress through the 
courts whenever they make a bad 
decision. Accordingly, the optimal 
legal scheme can’t reward customers for 
making bad decisions. 
GLOBAL RETAIL LENDING
In the final paper, Jörg Rocholl of 
the ESMT European School of Man-
agement and Technology presented 
the results of an empirical study (with 
Manju Puri and Sascha Steffen) of the 
effects of the crisis in U.S. mortgage 
markets on German banks. Rocholl 
and his coauthors used the unique 
structure of the German banking 
system as a natural experiment for 
distinguishing supply-side effects from 
demand-side effects.
Rocholl explained that there are 
11 Landsbanken in Germany, jointly 
owned by state governments and the 
savings banks in those states. The sav-
ings banks provide financial services 
only for the customers in their munici-
pality, primarily small and medium-
sized firms, as well as retail customers. 
A key feature of the system is that the 
Landsbanken can rely on both formal 
and informal support from the savings 
banks with an ownership share. Thus, 
losses at the Landsbanken will impose 
losses on the savings banks, which are 
significant owners.
In Rocholl’s account, Germany 
experienced growth well into 2008 and 
avoided the housing bubble occur-
ring in the U.S. and other European 
countries. Nor did it experience the 
housing bust. But a number of Lands-
banken were heavily exposed to risky 
U.S. housing assets and had experi-
enced large losses by the third quarter 
of 2007.
A key feature of the German 
banking market provided the setting 
for a natural experiment. Only some 
of the savings banks were owners of 
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affected Landsbanken, while others 
had no exposure to U.S. real estate 
losses. And since the national housing 
market was largely homogeneous, 
Rocholl and his coauthors argued that 
troubles at a savings bank’s Landsbank 
may be viewed as a pure shock to the 
supply of loans.
Using a difference-in-difference 
analysis, the authors compared the 
change in lending behavior at affected 
and unaffected savings banks before 
and after August 2007, when the U.S. 
housing crisis began to affect assets 
owned by certain Landsbanken. The 
authors also had information about 
loan applications at these banks, 
which made possible a clear distinction 
between changes in supply and 
demand.  For example, if the authors 
observed that loan applications were 
similar across savings banks, but fewer 
loans were booked at affected banks 
post-crisis, this is strong evidence that 
the underlying source of the change in 
lending was supply driven.
The authors had data on all 
consumer and mortgage loans by 
savings banks in Germany between 
July 2006 and June 2008. They also 
had data on loan applications and the 
bank’s risk rating of the consumer, 
as well as information about any 
preexisting financial relationships with 
the consumer, for example, credit lines 
and assets held at the bank.
In the central findings of the 
paper, Rocholl and his coauthors 
estimated a linear probability model 
of loan acceptance rates. They found 
that loan acceptance rates at affected 
banks declined significantly after 
August 2007, while acceptance rates 
increased insignificantly at unaffected 
banks.  The decline at affected banks 
was economically large; across all types 
of consumer lending, acceptance rates 
declined 8.2 percent. The decline 
was strongest for customers that were 
assigned low credit ratings by the 
banks, suggesting a flight-to-quality 
effect.  The results were consistent 
across loan categories, although 
the effects were larger for mortgage 
loans. The authors argued that this 
is because mortgage loans represent a 
larger commitment by the bank than 
other types of consumer loans.  
Rocholl and his coauthors also 
estimated a cross-sectional regression 
to examine how bank characteristics 
affected lending behavior. They found 
that the declines were most dramatic 
for smaller banks and that for such 
banks the declines were particularly 
large for mortgage loans. They also 
found that the effects were greatest 
for banks that were relatively illiquid 
entering the crisis.
The authors then examined the 
demand for loans. In a regression 
framework, the authors found that loan 
applications declined at both affected 
and unaffected banks. There was 
no statistically significant difference 
in the trend for these two groups 
of banks. The authors suggest that 
the decline in applications reflected 
a decline in demand, as consumers 
became less certain about future 
economic conditions, and the decline 
was not bank-specific. Nor did the 
authors find any significant difference 
in the amount of loan requested.  This 
reinforced the authors’ view that the 
declines in lending by affected banks 
were driven by the supply shock rather 
than effects on demand.
The authors then examined the 
effects of relationships in a linear 
probability model using a triple 
difference approach, in which loan 
applicants were further differentiated 
according to whether they had an 
existing relationship with the bank.  
Customer relationships with a bank 
increased acceptance rates, and the 
effect was strongest at affected banks 
after August 2007. Thus, pre-existing 
customer relationships mitigated the 
negative supply shocks at affected 
banks, perhaps because lenders 
have more information about such 
borrowers. B R